Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

Myths of the United States. "Roaring Cows" of the Soviet Navy

“Talking about the secrecy of the first Soviet submarines was simply meaningless. The Americans gave them the humiliating nickname “roaring cows”. The pursuit of Soviet engineers for the other characteristics of the boats (speed, depth, power weapons) did not save the situation. An airplane, a helicopter, or a torpedo would still be faster. And the boat, when discovered, turned into a “game”, not having become a “hunter”.

Here such statements are constantly found in Russian journals and books on domestic nuclear submarines (APL). This information was taken not from any official sources, but from American and English articles. That is why the terrible noise of the Soviet / Russian nuclear submarines is one of the myths of the United States.
It should be noted that not only Soviet shipbuilders encountered the problems of noise, and if we were able to immediately create a combat submarine capable of serving, then the Americans had more serious problems with their firstborn."Nautilus" had a lot of "childhood diseases", which is so characteristic of all experimental machines. His engine gave out such a level of noise that the sonars, the main means of orientation under water, were practically deaf. As a result, during a hike in the North Seas in the area of. Svalbard, sonars “overlooked” the drifting ice floe, which damaged the only periscope. In the future, the Americans launched a struggle to reduce noise. To achieve this, they abandoned the double-hulled boats, moving to one-and-a-half-hull and one-hull, sacrificing at the same time the important characteristics of the submarines: survivability, depth, and speed. In our country, built double-hull. But were the Soviet designers wrong, and the two-part submarines so noisy that their combat use would be meaningless?
It would, of course, be good to take data on the noise of domestic and foreign nuclear submarines and compare them. But it is impossible to do this, because official information on this issue is still considered to be secret (it suffices to recall the Iowa battleships, according to which the real characteristics were revealed only after 50 years).There is no information on American boats at all (and if it appears, then it should be treated with the same caution as with information about booking an LC Iowa). For domestic submarines sometimes there are scattered data. But what is this information? Here are four examples from different articles:
1) When designing the first Soviet nuclear submarine, a set of measures to ensure acoustic secrecy was created ........ However, shock absorbers for the main turbines were never created. As a result, the submarine noise level of the nuclear submarine of the project 627 at elevated speeds increased to 110 decibels.
2) The SSGN 670 of the project had a very low level of acoustic visibility for that time (among Soviet second generation nuclear-powered nuclear submarines, this submarine was considered the lowest noise level). Its noise at full speed in the ultrasonic frequency range was less than 80, in the infrasonic - 100, in the sound - 110 decibels.
3) When creating the third-generation submarines, it was possible to achieve a reduction in noise compared to the previous-generation submarines by 12 decibels, or 3.4 times.
4) Since the 70s of the last century, submarines reduced their noise level by an average of 1 dB per two years. Only in the last 19 years, from 1990 to the present, the average noise level of US submarines has decreased tenfold, from 0.1 Pa to 0.01 Pa.
It is in principle impossible to make any reasonable and logical conclusion from these data on the noise level. Therefore, we have only one way - to analyze the real facts of the service. Here are the most famous cases from the service of domestic submarines.1

1) In the course of an autonomous campaign in the South China Sea in 1968, the K-10 submarine from the number of the first generation of atomic missile carriers of the USSR (675 project) received an order to intercept the US Navy aircraft carrier. The aircraft carrier Enterprise covered the Long Beach rocket cruiser, frigates and support ships. At the calculated point, Captain 1st Rank R.V. Mazin led the submarine through the defensive lines of the American warrant directly below the bottom of the Enterprise. Hiding behind the noise of the screws of a gigantic ship, the submarine accompanied the strike force for thirteen hours. During this time, training torpedo attacks on all pennants of the order were worked out and acoustic profiles (characteristic noises of various vessels) were removed. After that, K-10 successfully left the order and ran a training rocket attack at a distance. In the event of a real war, the entire compound would be destroyed by choice: conventional torpedoes or a nuclear strike.It is interesting to note that American experts rated the project 675 extremely low. It was these submarines that they dubbed "Roaring Cows." And they could not find the ships of the US aircraft carrier. The boats of the 675th project were used not only for tracking surface ships, but sometimes they also “ruined life” for American nuclear-powered ships that were on duty. Thus, in 1967, the K-135 for 5.5 hours continuously monitored the Patrick Henry SSBN, remaining not detected by itself.
2) In 1979, during another exacerbation of Soviet-American relations, the K-38 and K-481 nuclear submarines (app. 671) carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where up to 50 US Navy ships were in that period. The hike lasted 6 months. Member of the campaign A.N. Shporko reported that the Soviet submarines were operating in the Persian Gulf very covertly: if the US Navy did find them briefly, they could not properly classify, much less organize the pursuit and work out conditional destruction. Subsequently, these findings were confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking the ships of the US Navy was carried out at a range of use of weapons and if received, they would be sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%2

3) In March 1984, the United States and South Korea conducted their regular annual naval exercises, Team Spirit .. In Moscow and Pyongyang, they followed the exercises closely. A K-314 nuclear-powered torpedo submarine (Ex. 671, this is the second generation of nuclear submarines, also reproached for noise) and six combat ships were sent to monitor the US aircraft carrier strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven US warships. Four days later, the K-314 was able to detect a carrier strike group of the US Navy. Observation of the aircraft carrier was carried out over the next 7 days, then after the discovery of the Soviet nuclear submarine, the aircraft carrier entered the territorial waters of South Korea. "K-314" remained outside the territorial waters.
Having lost hydroacoustic contact with the aircraft carrier, the boat commanded by Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Yevseenko continued the search. The Soviet submarine went to the proposed location of the aircraft carrier, but it was not there. The American side kept radio silence.
On March 21, a Soviet submarine discovered strange noises. To clarify the situation the boat floated to the periscope depth. The clock was the beginning of the eleventh.According to Vladimir Yevseyenko, several American ships were observed that were going to meet each other. It was decided to dive, but it was too late. The aircraft carrier, unnoticed by the crew of the submarine, with the running lights turned off, was moving at a speed of about 30 km / h. K-314 was ahead of Kitty Hawk. There was a blow, followed by another. At first, the team decided that the cutting was damaged, but when checking the water in the compartments was not found. As it turned out, during the first collision the stabilizer was bent, during the second the screw was damaged. A huge tug Mashuk was sent to her for help. The boat was towed to Chazhma Bay, 50 km east of Vladivostok, where it was to undergo repairs.
For Americans, the collision was also unexpected. According to them, after the strike, they saw the receding silhouette of a submarine without navigation lights. Two US SH-3H anti-submarine helicopters were raised. Accompanying the Soviet submarine, they did not detect any visible serious damage. However, when hitting the submarine, the propeller was out of action, and it began to lose speed. Screw was damaged and the body of the aircraft carrier.It turned out that his bottom was proportional to 40 meters. Fortunately, no one was hurt in this incident. Kitty Hawk was forced to repair the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines before returning to San Diego. On examination of the aircraft carrier, a fragment of K-314 propeller stuck in the hull was found, as well as pieces of the sound-absorbing coating of the submarine. The exercises were curtailed. The incident caused a lot of noise: the American press was actively discussing how the submarine was able to sail unnoticed at such close distance to the US Navy's aircraft carrier group conducting the exercises, including those with an anti-submarine orientation.3

4) In the winter of 1996, 150 miles from the Hebrides. On February 29, the Russian Embassy in London appealed to the command of the British Navy with a request to assist the crew member of the submarine 671RTM (code Pike, second generation +), who underwent appendicitis surgery onboard the vessel (followed by peritonitis). hospital). Soon the sick with a helicopter "Lynx" from the destroyer "Glasgow" was redirected to the shore. However, the British media was not so much touched by the manifestation of naval cooperation between Russia and Britain, but expressed bewilderment about the factthat during talks in London, in the North Atlantic, in the area where the submarine of the Russian Navy was located, NATO anti-submarine maneuvers were held (by the way, the Glasgow EM also participated in them). But the icebreaker was able to detect only after he himself surfaced to transfer the sailor to the helicopter. According to the Times, the Russian submarine has demonstrated its secrecy in tracking anti-submarine forces conducting an active search. It is noteworthy that the British in an official statement made for the media initially attributed the "Pike" to the more modern (more quiet) project 971, and only after they admitted that they could not notice the noisy Soviet boat of the project 671RTM by their own statements.4

5) On May 23, 1981, a Soviet submarine K-211 (SSBN 667-BDR) and an American submarine of the Sturgen type collided in one of the SF landfills near the Kola Bay. An American submarine rammed its aft part of the K-211 with its cabin while working on its combat training elements. The American submarine did not surface in the collision area. However, in the area of ​​the English naval base of Holy Loch a few days later an American nuclear submarine appeared with pronounced damage to the cabin.Our submarine surfaced, and came to the base under its own power. Here the submarine was awaited by a commission, which consisted of specialists from industry, fleet, designer and science. The K-211 was docked, and there, during the inspection, holes were found in two feed tanks of the main ballast, damage to the horizontal stabilizer and blades of the right propeller. In the damaged tanks found bolts with countersunk heads pieces of Plexus and metal from the cabin of the US Navy submarine. Moreover, the commission for individual parts was able to establish that the Soviet submarine collided with an American submarine of the type “Sturgeon. The huge SSBN 667 pr, as well as all the SSBNs, was not designed for abrupt maneuvers that the American nuclear-powered submarine could not dodge, so the only explanation for this incident was that Sturgent did not see and did not even suspect that K- 211. It should be noted that the boats of the type “Sturgeon” were intended specifically for the fight against submarines and carried relevant modern search equipment.
It should be noted that the collisions of submarines are not so rare.The last for the Russian and American nuclear submarines was a collision near the island of Kildin, in Russian territorial waters, on February 11, 1992 the nuclear submarine K-276 (commissioned in 1982) under the command of second-rank captain I. Loktya collided with the American nuclear submarine Baton Rouge ("Los Angeles"), which, tracking the ships of the Russian Navy in the exercise area, buried the Russian nuclear submarine. As a result of the collision at the "Crab" was damaged cabin. The position of the American nuclear submarine was more difficult, she barely managed to reach the base, after which they decided not to repair the boat, but to withdraw it from the fleet.5

6) Perhaps the brightest fragment in the biography of the ships of the 671RTM project was their participation in large operations “Aport” and “Atrina”, conducted by the 33rd division in the Atlantic and significantly shaken the United States in the ability of its Navy to solve anti-submarine tasks.
On May 29, 1985, three submarines of the 671RTM project (K-502, K-324, K-299), as well as the K-488 submarine (project 671RT), simultaneously sailed from West Litsa. Later, the submarine of Project 671 - K-147 joined them. Of course, the release of a whole compound of nuclear submarines into the ocean for US naval intelligence could not go unnoticed.Intensive searches began, but they did not bring the expected results. At the same time, the Soviet nuclear submarines operating secretly themselves monitored missile submarines of the US Navy in the area of ​​their combat patrols (for example, the K-324 submarine had three hydroacoustic contacts with the US submarines for a total of 28 hours. And the K-147 equipped with the latest The submarine on the wake, using the specified system and acoustic means, performed a six-day (!!!) tracking of the American SSBN "Simon Bolivar". In addition, the submarines also studied the tactics of the action of American anti-submarine aviation. ntsam managed to make contact only with the already returning to the base of the K-488. July 1 "Sic" operation ended.
7) In March-June of the 87th year, the operation “Atrina” was close in scope, in which five submarines of the 671RTM project — K-244 (commanded by a captain of the second rank V. Alikov) and K-255 — took part (under the command of a captain of the second rank) B. Yu. Muratova), K-298 (under the command of Captain Second Rank Popkov), K-299 (under the command of Captain Second Rank NI Klyuev) and K-524 (under the command of Captain Second Rank AFSmelkov). Although the Americans found out about the withdrawal of nuclear submarines from West Faces, they lost ships in the North Atlantic. The “underwater hunt” began again, in which practically all the anti-submarine forces of the American Atlantic fleet were attracted - coastal and deck-based aircraft, six anti-submarine nuclear submarines (in addition to the submarines already deployed by the United States naval forces in the Atlantic) groups and 3 newest ships of the Stolworth type (ships of hydroacoustic observation), which used powerful underwater explosions to form a sonar pulse. The ships of the English fleet were involved in the search operation. According to the stories of the commanders of the domestic submarines, the concentration of anti-submarine forces was so great that it seemed impossible to podspleskit for air pumping and radio communication session. For Americans who failed in 1985, it was necessary to regain face. Despite the fact that all possible anti-submarine forces of the US Navy and their allies were pulled into the area, the nuclear submarines managed to reach the Sargasso Sea area unnoticed, where the Soviet “veil” was finally discovered.The Americans managed to establish the first short contacts with submarines only eight days after the operation “Atrina” began. At the same time, the submarine of the 671RTM project was mistaken for strategic missile submarines, which only increased the concerns of the US naval command and the political leadership of the country "Hot"). During the return to the base, the submarine commanders were allowed to use secret means of hydroacoustic counteraction from the US Navy's anti-submarine weapons;
The success of the operations "Atrin" and "Aport" confirmed the assumption that the naval forces of the United States with the massive use of modern nuclear submarines by the Soviet Union will not be able to organize any effective counteraction against them.
As we see from the available facts,American anti-submarine forces were not capable of detecting Soviet submarines, including those of the first generation, and to protect their Navy from sudden strikes from the depths. And all the statements that “Talking about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines was simply meaningless” do not have a basis.
Now let us analyze the myth that high speeds, maneuverability and depth of immersion do not give any advantages. And again we turn to the known facts:6

1) In September-December 1971, the Soviet nuclear submarine of Project 661 (K-162 number) made its first march to full autonomy with a combat route from the Greenland Sea to the Brazil Depression. In October, the submarine intercepted the US Navy strike base, the head of which was the aircraft carrier "Saratoga". The submarine was able to detect on the ships of cover and tried to drive off. Under normal conditions, notching a submarine would mean disrupting a combat mission, but not in this case. The K-162 developed a speed of more than 44 knots submerged. Attempts to drive off the K-162, or break away at speed, were not successful. There were no chances for Saratoga with a maximum of 35 knots.During the many hours of chase, the Soviet submarine worked out training torpedo attacks and several times came out at a favorable angle for launching Amethyst missiles. But the most interesting thing is that the submarine maneuvered so quickly that the Americans were sure that they were being pursued by a “wolf pack” - a group of submarines. What does it mean? This suggests that the appearance of the boat in the new square was for the Americans so unexpected, or rather unexpected, that they considered this a contact with the new submarine. Consequently, in the case of hostilities, the Americans would produce a search and attack at a completely different square. Thus, it is almost impossible to avoid an attack, nor to destroy a submarine in the presence of high-speed submarines.7

2) At the beginning of the 1980s. One of the USSR nuclear submarines, which operated in the North Atlantic, was set a kind of record, it followed the nuclear vessel of the “potential enemy” for 22 hours while in the aft sector of the tracking object. Despite all the attempts of the commander of the NATO submarine to change the situation, it was not possible to throw the enemy off the tail: the tracking was stopped only after the commander of the Soviet submarine received relevant orders from the shore.This incident occurred with a nuclear submarine of the 705th project - perhaps the most controversial and bright ship in the history of Soviet submarine shipbuilding. This project deserves a separate article. The submarine pr.705 had a maximum travel speed, which is comparable to the speed of universal and anti-submarine torpedoes of “potential adversaries”, but most importantly, due to the peculiarities of the power plant reactors), were able to develop a full stroke in minutes, having almost “aircraft” acceleration characteristics. A significant speed allowed for a short time to enter the "shadow" sector of the underwater or surface ship, even if the Alpha was previously detected by the enemy's hydroacoustics. According to the memoirs of Rear Admiral Bogatyrev, who in the past was the commander of K-123 (Project 705K), the submarine could turn around "on the patch", which is especially important during active tracking of the "enemy" and its submarines one after another. "Alpha" did not allow other submarines to go into the course aft corners (i.e., in the zone of sonar shade),which are particularly favorable for tracking and delivering sudden torpedo attacks.
The high maneuvering and speed characteristics of the nuclear submarine of Project 705 made it possible to work out effective maneuvers of evading enemy torpedoes with further counterattack. In particular, the submarine could circulate at a maximum speed of 180 degrees and already after 42 seconds to start moving in the opposite direction. The commanders of nuclear submarines of the project 705 AF Zagryadsky and A.U. Abbasov said that such a maneuver made it possible, while gradually increasing the speed to the maximum and simultaneously making a turn with a change in depth, to force the enemy following them in the direction-finding mode to lose target, and to the Soviet nuclear submarine to “drop the enemy”.8

3) On August 4, 1984, the K-278 Komsomolets nuclear submarine made an immersive immersion in the history of world military navigation: first, the depth gauges of its depth gauges stopped at a 1000-meter mark, and then crossed it. K-278 made swimming and maneuvering at a depth of 1027m, and at a depth of 1000 meters made torpedo firing.It seems to journalists as the usual whim of the Soviet military and constructors. They do not understand why it is necessary to achieve such depths, if the Americans at that time limited themselves to 450 meters. To do this, you need to know ocean hydroacoustics. Increasing the depth reduces non-linear detection. Between the upper, highly heated layer of ocean water and the lower, colder layer, lies the so-called temperature jump layer. If, say, the sound source is in a cold dense layer, over which a warm and less dense layer is located, the sound is reflected from the boundary of the upper layer and propagates only in the lower cold layer. In this case, the upper layer is a “silence zone”, a “shadow zone”, which is not penetrated by the noise from the submarine’s propellers. Simple anti-submarine anti-submarine navigators will not be able to grope it, and the submarine can feel safe. There may be several such layers in the ocean, and each layer additionally hides a submarine. An even greater concealing effect has the axis of the terrestrial sound channel below which the working depth K-278 was.Even the Americans recognized that detecting submarines at a depth of 800 m and more is impossible by any means. And anti-submarine torpedoes are not designed for such depth. Thus, the K-278 reaching the working depth was invisible and invulnerable.
Do questions arise after this about the importance of maximum speeds, depth, and maneuverability for submarines?
And now we give the statements of officials and institutions, which for some reason, domestic journalists prefer to ignore.
According to MIPT scientists, given in the work “The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussion and Arguments” (ed. Dolgoprudny, 1995) .s even under the most favorable hydrological conditions (the probability of their occurrence in the northern seas is not more than 0.03). 971 (for reference: serial construction began in the distant 1980) can be detected by American submarines "Los Angeles" with GAKAN / BQQ-5 at distances of no more than 10 km. Under less favorable conditions (ie, with 97% of weather conditions in the northern seas), it is not possible to detect Russian submarines.
There is also a statement by a prominent US naval analyst N. Polmoran made at a hearing in the National Security Committee of the US House of Representatives: “The emergence of 3rd-generation Russian submarines demonstratedthat Soviet shipbuilders filled the noise gap much earlier than we could have imagined. According to the US Navy, at operational speeds of the order of 5-7 knots, the noise of Russian 3rd generation boats, recorded by US hydroacoustic reconnaissance, was lower than that of the most advanced US NPS submarines such as Improved Los Angeles. ”
According to the head of the operational department of the US Navy, Admiral D. Burd (Jeremi Boorda), made in 1995, American ships are not able to accompany the third-generation Russian submarines at speeds of 6-9 knots.
This is probably enough to assert that the Russian “roaring cows” are able to accomplish the tasks facing them in any opposition of the enemy.

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  • Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy

    Myths of the United States. Roaring cows of the Soviet Navy